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ABSTRACT 
Dual process theorists posit the existence of two distinct types (type-1/type-2) of 
cognitive processing in order to explain domains of higher cognition such as reasoning and 
decision-making. Such theories typically allude to co-varying clusters of properties (i.e. a dual-
cluster thesis) as well as an underlying mechanism or system for each processing type (i.e. a dual 
systems thesis). I will argue that a host of empirical findings cast doubt upon the validity of both 
theses, and that simpler models of higher cognition—that do not appeal to types of processing—
might be preferable.    
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1 
1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In the last few decades, psychologists and philosophers have developed dual process 
theories to give accounts of the processes involved in decision making, moral reasoning, and 
social cognition.1 Dual process theorists make a distinction between two kinds of cognitive 
processes implicated in thought. Type-1 processes possess properties such as being unconscious, 
shared with non-human animals, associative, being relatively fast, and evolutionarily old. Type-2 
processes are typically said to possess features that contrast with these (see Figure 1). They are 
often described as being conscious, unique to humans, rule-based, being relatively slow, and 
evolutionarily new. At the least, dual process theorists are committed to saying that there are two 
distinct types of processing (Evans 2011), and that each is identified by a cluster of co-varying 
properties (Samuels 2009, p. 131).2  
The appearance of such clustering has typically been explained by a division in cognitive 
architecture.3 The idea is that some distinct cognitive mechanism—or set of mechanisms—
undergirds each of the processing types. Samuels refers to this as the Dual-Systems thesis 
(Samuels 2009, pg. 132). Dual process theorists are then committed to the following specific 
                                                 
1 See Evans (2008) and Frankish (2010) for a  review of the dual process theory literature  
2 Samuels (2009) distinguishes between the dual-cluster thesis and the dual-systems thesis. The dual-cluster thesis 
just states that there are two co-varying clusters of properties associated with each processing type. The dual-system 
thesis invokes separate systems to explain the presence of the co-varying property clusters. But a dual process 
theorist can remain neutral with respect to the latter thesis. Thus, they can hold the dual cluster thesis without 
endorsing the dual-system thesis. However, within the dual process literature, both of these theses typically hang 
together.  
3 Cognitive architecture can be distinguished from neural architecture. It is an abstract description of the structure 
and parts of the mind (e.g. working memory), rather than the concrete structure and parts of the brain (e.g. 
amygdala, cerebellum). Cognitive architecture is discussed often by psychologists, artificial intelligence researchers, 
and philosophers. Psychologists have theorized about the how mental processes involved in general intelligence, 
memory, and attention work in human beings. Artificial intelligence researchers have theorized about how to 
implement such cognitive abilities in robots and computers. Lastly, philosophers have theorized about what sorts of 
structure and parts the mind might have given the presence of certain cognitive abilities (e.g. productivity: the ability 
to entertain an infinite number of different thoughts/sentences). 
2 
claims. First, certain properties cluster together with each of the processing types and second, 
some difference in the architecture of the mind-brain explains why.4 These two features—
clustering properties and the postulation of differing mechanisms—would qualify type-1/type-2 
processes as natural kinds.5 Within the philosophy of science, natural kinds are understood as 
classes of objects or entities for which many scientific inductive generalizations can be made 
(Mill 1884, Quine 1969). Natural kinds can be also be thought of as the building blocks of 
scientific theories, groupings of objects that are thought to reflect the structure of the world 
rather than just the interests of human beings. For instance, within the science of chemistry, the 
elements that make up the periodic table (e.g. hydrogen, aluminum) are all instances of natural 
kinds. Some examples of non-natural kinds include pets, green objects, and people named Mike.6  
 Table 1 Standard menu of dual process theory 
 
                                                 
4 Stanovich and Evans (2013) are reluctant to talk of systems as it may falsely imply that there is one token system 
of each type. Since they happen to think there are multiple type-1 systems (e.g. modules, associatively learned 
mechanisms etc.), they now tend to only speak of type-1/type-2 processing to avoid this confusion.  
5 Type-1/type-2 processes would be natural kinds within the science of psychology. Other psychological kinds might 
include pain, the basic emotions (e.g. anger, happiness), perception, and cognition. If type-1/type-2 processes are 
natural kinds, then cognition would be subdivided into two sub-types: type-1 and type-2.  
6 For instance, pets are non-natural because the class of animals is determined by human preferences for certain 
features (e.g. docility). Mammals are a natural grouping of organisms because all mammals share certain properties 
(e.g. females having mammary glands for producing milk). 
Type-1 Type-2 
Associative Rule-based 
Heuristic Analytic 
Parallel Serial 
Automatic Controlled 
Intuitive Reflective 
Unconscious Conscious 
Low demands on     
cognitive capacity 
High demands on  
cognitive capacity 
Relatively fast Relatively slow 
Contextualized Decontextualized 
Evolutionarily Old Evolutionarily New 
New Nnew             Conserved across species Unique to humans 
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 The philosopher Richard Samuels discusses a potential problem for a natural kinds 
interpretation of dual process theory, which he calls the crossover problem (Samuels 2009, pg. 
140). Crossover occurs whenever you have processes with both type-1 and type-2 features. For 
example, an unconscious process that is rule-based. Crossover can be a problem because the 
alignment of properties is what is supposed to distinguish the two processing types. The extent to 
which crossover is problematic for dual process theories depends on how often or how drastic it 
is. For example, if psychologists were to discover that all unconscious processes are rule-based 
rather than associative, an auxiliary hypothesis of the theory would be falsified. But in this case, 
dual process theorists could just give up that one auxiliary hypothesis and just remove that 
particular feature from the menu of properties. While crossover between a set of processing 
features can be easily remedied—by just dropping a couple of properties from the menu—
crossover across virtually all of the properties might falsify the view entirely. One of the major 
predictions of dual process theory is that certain clusters of properties are probabilistically 
connected, and that certain inferences can be made about a given cognitive process. For example, 
if a cognitive process is unconscious, then it is likely to be associative. The existence of 
crossover—resulting in hybrid cognitive processes—might render such inferences (e.g. 
unconsciousassociative) invalid (Mandlebaum 2015). Unless the dual process theorists can 
accommodate these instances of crossover, by demonstrating that they are the exception rather 
than the rule, crossover across most properties would constitute a serious threat to the view.  
In this paper, I will argue that type-1/type-2 processes probably aren’t natural kinds, and 
subsequently, that if they are not, type-1/type-2 processes would, at best, serve various heuristic 
purposes such as generating new hypotheses. I will then consider alternative models of higher 
cognition that are simpler yet possibly explanatorily equivalent. The Unimodel (Kruglanski and 
4 
Gigerenzer 2011) does not carve out a distinction between different processing types, but 
instead, appeals to processing features on a continuum, allowing for intermediary cases as well 
as hybrid processes. I will argue that if the Unimodel can explain psychological phenomena as 
well as dual process theory, we ought to eliminate type-1/type-2 terminology from scientific 
theorizing about the mind altogether.  
In section 2, I elucidate and challenge a thesis which I shall call Rigidity. Rigidity is a 
natural kinds thesis, which entails that should there is no significant crossover between features 
of type-1 and type-2 processes. Given that our theories are understood to be picking out natural 
kinds, you would expect the features of each type to be fairly rigid, with the occasional 
exceptions. For example, type-1 processes are said to possess the feature of being unconscious, 
while type-2 processes are often characterized as rule-based. To challenge Rigidity, I will 
marshal evidence for crossover from various psychological studies (e.g. Girelli et al. 2001, 
Brinol et al. 2009, Sechrist and Stangor 2001). For instance, several independent studies indicate 
that implicit racial attitudes possess features of both type-1 and type-2 processes. Specifically, 
implicit attitudes seem to be both unconscious and rule-based.  
In section 3, I critique how Keith Stanovich and Jonathan Evans—two prominent dual 
process theorists—deal with the crossover problem (Stanovich and Evans 2013). Instead of 
arguing that crossover rarely occurs, they propose defining features of type-1/type-2 processes. I 
outline several problems with Stanovich and Evan’s response to crossover and argue that dual 
process theorists should instead try to explain away all of the instances of crossover with a divide 
and conquer strategy.  
           In section 4, I discuss why it matters whether type-1/type-2 processes are natural kinds, 
and what follows if they are not.  I first discuss the possibility of eliminating type-1/type-2 
5 
processes altogether from our scientific discourse. If type-1/type-2 processes can be shown to be 
useful for scientific theorizing, then dual process theory might remain relevant to psychology. I 
then argue that if there are simpler models of higher cognition—such as the Unimodel—that can 
perform the same explanatory work as dual process theory, then such models ought to be 
preferred on grounds of parsimony. 
 
2     THE PROBLEM OF CROSSOVER 
2.1 Rigidity 
 Dual process theories have been around withiin the field of psychology for at least a 
hundred years. For example, take Freud’s early distinction between primary and secondary 
processes (Freud 1915). Freud characterized primary processes as unconscious, associative and 
appearing early in development (e.g. childhood), whereas secondary processes are characterized 
as conscious, logical and appearing later in development. While splitting up processes into two 
types may sound trivially easy to do and scientifically uninteresting (e.g. simple vs. complex 
processes, fast vs. slow processes) dual process theories are also committed to the following 
specific claims. First, that there exist different kinds of cognitive processes and further, that there 
are just two.7 Each cognitive kind is thought to possess a non-arbitrary cluster of features that 
contrast with each other. As Richard Samuels puts it, “a central and far from banal commitment 
of dual-process theories is that cognitive processes—either generally or within some domain, 
such as reasoning-can be divided in two: those that possess the S1-property cluster and those that 
                                                 
7 It may be argued that there are dual process theorists, such as Keith Stanovich, who do not commit themselves to 
limiting processing types to two. Stanovich (2009) thinks that there may be three different types of processes.  
However, if there turned out to be three types of cognitive processes, dual process theory would not be an apt name 
for the view.  
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possess the S2-property cluster”(Samuels 2009, p 131).8 This means that if some cognitive 
process C possesses stereotypic type-1 properties, then it shouldn’t also possess one or many 
stereotypic type-2 properties. Such properties ought to line up with their respective type of 
process.  
 According to the influential HPC (Homeostatic property cluster) conception, a natural 
kind consists of a cluster of properties that regularly occur together, and a homeostatic 
mechanism that explains why the clustered properties co-occur (Boyd 1991).9 If one understands 
dual process theory as a theory of natural kinds, then one would predict that type-1/type-2 
processes to be strongly correlated with their respective features.10           
Since these co-varying property clusters are supposed to be what distinguishes the two 
processing mechanisms from one another, significant overlap between their respective property 
clusters would blur the distinction considerably. Samuels refers to this possibility as “the 
crossover problem” (Samuels 2009, p 140). As Samuels notes, the mere existence of crossover 
(i.e. a single instance) wouldn’t be enough to warrant a rejection of dual-process theory. Even if 
it were found that a given feature routinely resulted in hybrid processes, one could simply 
remove that feature from the list of co-varying properties. However, if cross-over were found to 
be ubiquitous (i.e. across most properties), the view would be in need of some serious re-
modeling and perhaps even abandonment. While I do not think there are many dual process 
theorists committed to the stronger claim—i.e. no crossover whatsoever—some would be 
                                                 
8 Theorists also refer to the distinction as between (s)ystem-1/(s)ystem-2 processes. 
9 A single homeostatic mechanism is typical but not required for natural kind membership. For instance, within the 
science of biology, species are natural kinds but are propagated by several homeostatic mechanisms.  
10 By strongly correlated, I mean correlations that obtain over 80% of the time. 80% is arbitrary, though generous to 
dual process theory. Clearly, correlations that obtain 51% of the time would not have much predictive value. The 
relevant question that follows would be, ‘How often does crossover obtain?’.  
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committed to the weaker claim (i.e. some crossover but nothing significant), especially to those 
who think the distinction maps out psychological kinds.  I define Rigidity as follows: 
 
Rigidity: Type-1 processes rarely have type-2 features. Type-2 processes rarely have 
type-1 features (i.e. no significant crossover). 
 
While something like Rigidity is not explicitly endorsed in the literature, it can be seen as 
an implicit assumption in most dual process theories, conceded by some to be the received view 
(Stanovich and Evans 2013). Dual process theorists typically provide nice tables that present the 
features of each of the processing types (Evans 2008). The presentation of the features in this 
manner suggests some sort of organized division between features.11 
For certain groupings of processing features, strong correlations certainly obtain. For 
example, processes that are automatic are going to be relatively fast. However, you don’t need a 
scientific theory to tell you that. In virtue of what it means to be automatic, it follows that the 
process is going to be relatively fast. Similarly, controlled processes seem to, by definition, 
involve some degree of conscious awareness. Control takes effort, and effort takes some degree 
of attention and awareness. It is thus both unsurprising and unimpressive to find strong 
correlations amongst such features. On the other hand, there are many processing features that 
allow for the possibility to mismatch. For instance, it is logically possible for there to be 
unconscious processes that are relatively slow. In order to properly test for claims of Rigidity, 
it’s best to look at sets of features where misalignment is a logical possibility. In the following 
section, I will look at six possible counter examples to dual process theory. While even some of 
                                                 
11 If dual process theorists are fine with hybrid processes, given crossover, a better way to illustrate their view would 
be with a Venn diagram. 
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the leading dual process theorists agree that crossover occurs (Stanovich and Evans 2013), it is 
still instructive to discuss each of the alleged counter examples in turn. Dual process theorists 
may want to challenge such proposed counter examples by offering alternative interpretations of 
the empirical findings or by demonstrating that crossover in such cases is relatively rare.  I will 
argue that collectively, the current state of evidence casts great doubt upon the validity of dual 
process models, and suggests that type-1/type-2 processes are probably not natural kinds. 
2.2 The empirical evidence for crossover 
In this section, I will discuss six proposed instances of crossover. First, I will discuss a 
proposal made by Samuels (2009), which if genuine, opens the door to many more instances of 
crossover. I will then discuss a rather robust example of crossover put forward by Mandelbaum 
(2015a). Lastly, I will consider several other instances of crossover found within the reasoning 
and decision-making literature as well as some possible instances that arise from the animal 
cognition literature. 
2.2.1 Evolutionarily new type-1 processes 
Type-1 processes are usually characterized as evolutionary old, whereas type-2 processes are 
usually characterized as evolutionary recent. Samuels (2009) discusses a possible instance of 
crossover: i.e. an otherwise type-1 process with the feature of being evolutionary recent (Girelli 
et al. 2001).  
“There appear to be evolutionary recent processes that possess many S1 
properties. So for example, judgments of numerical magnitude involving familiar, 
conventional numeral systems—such as Arabic numerals—possess many S1 
properties. For instance, they are relatively fast (~200 ms); and appear to be 
automatic in that they exhibit Stroop-like effects” (140). 
9 
 Samuels concludes that since Arabic numerals are a recent cultural invention, the processing 
of such a numeral system must also be an evolutionary recent one (Samuels 2009, pg. 140). 
Thus, it looks as if we have a case where there is a process that is fast, automatic, and 
evolutionary recent. If judgments of numerical magnitude are instantiated by newly formed 
cognitive processes, presumably so would judgments involving representations of other symbol 
systems (e.g. alphabets), various heuristics and biases (e.g. implicit racial biases) as well as the 
intuitive judgments of experts. For example, chess masters—whom typically over 10,000 hours 
of practice—quickly judge whether or not a particular move is good or not (Kahneman 2011, pg. 
238). While not everyone is a chess master, virtually everyone acquires expertise with respect to 
some skill or area of study (e.g. reading, free throw shooting, cooking, the law). When it comes 
to type-1 processes, evolutionary recency may be the rule rather than the exception. This would 
mean that in the case of evolutionary recent type-1 processes, crossover is quite widespread.  
In support of evolutionary recent type-1 processes, there are a number of well-documented 
instances of quite rapid evolutionary change throughout the animal kingdom (Reznick et al. 
1997, McKinnon et al. 2002, Stuart et al. 2014).12 To give one such example, stickleback fish 
have been found to undergo significant morphological changes (e.g. a loss of heavy armor plated 
scales) within ten generations (McKinnon et al. 2002). Such changes occur when marine 
sticklebacks are introduced into freshwater ecosystems and vice versa. There is uncertainty as to 
how rapidly brains evolve, but in general, evolutionary change does not always occur in a slow 
gradual fashion. 
However, one might argue that the experimental findings cited by Samuels (i.e. Girelli et 
al. 2001) are open to another interpretation. One might think it is more plausible that most of our 
                                                 
12 Some of these studies show speciation occurring within the lifetime of a single scientist.  
10 
cognitive processes carry out multiple functions and unlikely that each process was tailor-made 
for carrying out any one in particular. Samuels seems to reason that because the Arabic numerals 
are a recent cultural invention, any process which takes them onboard must be an evolutionary 
recent process. But isn’t it possible that what we have here is an evolutionary old process has 
been co-opted to use new types of stimuli?13 Put another way, perhaps these cognitive processes 
are exaptations.14 One reason for preferring such an explanation would reside in the sheer 
number of adaptations that would have had to take place within the past 10,000 years or so in 
order for there to exist novel cognitive processes.  Given the short time frame, considerable 
changes in cognitive processes may seem prima facie unlikely.  
While these questions are ultimately an empirical matter, the suggestion of recent 
evolutionary change is by no means unreasonable. In fact, some prominent dual process theorists 
have already abandoned ship by admitting that evolutionary recent type-1 processes are likely 
(Evans 2006). At this point, crossover has only been established for one pair of the proposed 
dichotomous properties. Next, I will discuss another instance of crossover; type-1 processes that 
appear to be rule-based.    
2.2.2 Rule-based type-1 processes 
Type-1 processes are typically characterized as associative, whereas type-2 processes are 
characterized as rule-based or possessing a propositional structure. Mandelbaum (2015a) argues 
that implicit biases are best characterized as having many type-1 features as well as a feature 
prototypical of type-2 processes. Namely, implicit biases are fast, automatic and rule-based.  
 
                                                 
13  Dehaene (2005, 2007) argues that humans’ (universal) ability to read results from co-opting evolutionary old 
neural structures.  
14 An exaptation is when a feature or trait selected by natural selection comes to serve a new function (Gould and 
Vrba 1982). For example, feathers were originally selected for thermal insulation, but later were coopted for flight.  
11 
Within the research literature, social psychologists typically assume that implicit biases are 
thoroughly associative. That is to say, implicit biases are acquired by some associative process 
(e.g. classical conditioning) and they possess an associative structure as well.15 Psychologists 
measure the degree of implicit bias by having subjects complete an implicit association test 
(IAT). Roughly speaking, an IAT measures how long a subject takes to associate a presented 
image with a valence (e.g. ‘good’ or ‘bad’). For instance, subjects may be presented with 
photographs of people from different racial or ethnic backgrounds. The longer it takes for a 
subject to associate members of a given racial group with something ‘good’ (e.g. the words 
‘beautiful’, ‘kind’), the more engrained the implicit racial bias is towards that racial group. 
Mandelbaum begins by pointing out that though it’s been assumed by social psychologists, an 
implicit bias need not be associative through and through. There is nothing contradictory about 
supposing that something associatively learned could have a non-associative structure. In order 
to infer whether the structure of an implicit bias is associative or not, we have to look at how 
certain kinds of stimuli alter or fail to affect behaviors associated with such cognitive processes 
(Mandelbaum 2015a, p 6). Mandelbaum discusses four relevant bodies of research that have 
measured such behavioral effects, all of which indicate that implicit biases have a non-
associative structure. I will briefly summarize two of these findings. 
The first kind of study found that implicit biases are sensitive to the strength of arguments 
(Brinol et al. 2009). Experimenters designed an IAT for race and one for vegetables. For the race 
IAT study, one group of subjects would read a message containing strong arguments in favor of 
hiring African American professors (e.g. it would increase the number and quality of professors) 
                                                 
15 Two mental states X and Y (e.g. the thought of snakes and the emotion fear) possess an associative structure if 
“activations of mental state X bring about mental state Y and vice versa without the mediation of any other 
psychological states” (Mandelbaum 2015b). 
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while the other group read weak arguments in favor of the proposal (e.g. it’s the trendy thing to 
do). For the vegetable IAT study, one group of subjects read a message containing convincing 
reasons to eat vegetables (e.g. high in vitamin content), whereas another group read a message 
containing unpersuasive reasons to eat them (e.g. they look beautiful on plates). The researchers 
carefully controlled for associations by ensuring that both the strong and weak messages 
mentioned the key terms the same amount of times (i.e. ‘African American professor’ and 
‘vegetable’). They found that subjects who read the strong arguments scored more positively on 
race IATs than those who had read the weak arguments. The same finding was found for the 
vegetable group.  
A second study (Sechrist and Stangor 2001) found a similar effect. This study measured 
seating distance—a reliable indicator of one’s implicit attitudes (Macrae et al. 1994)—of 
participants from an African American confederate in a waiting room after the subjects had:  1) 
filled out a survey regarding racial bias, and 2) been informed of the survey results from their 
peers. After filling out the surveys, participants were placed into high and low prejudice groups. 
The participants were then individually told how their survey results compared with their peers 
(i.e. other college students from the same university). Half of each group were told that a large 
majority (i.e. 81%) of their peers agreed with them while the other half was told that the majority 
of their peers disagreed. After being informed of the survey results, the participants were then 
told to sit down in a waiting room containing an African American confederate. What the 
researchers found was that merely being informed of peer consensus or lack thereof affected how 
far or close the participants sat from the African American confederate.16  
                                                 
16 If the participant held a bias and was aware of peer consensus, then participant would sit, on average, further 
away. If the participant did not hold a bias and was aware of peer consensus, the participant would sit, on average, 
closer to the African American confederate.  
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The take home message is that these studies indicate that implicit biases can be altered in a 
non-associative way. In the first study, the strength or weakness of arguments influenced 
performance on IAT tests. In the second study, the recognition of peer agreement/disagreement 
regarding racial attitudes influenced seating distance from an African American confederate. 
This is because determining whether an argument is good or not, or recognizing that one’s peers 
agree/disagree with oneself plausibly requires some sort of reflection in the form of logical or 
rational procedures, whether it be unconscious or conscious. In other words, the process involves 
some rule-following, whereas the implicit bias, if merely associative, would not contain such 
characteristics. Mandelbaum’s argument takes the form of a modus tollens. If implicit biases 
have an associative structure, they can only be altered one of the following two ways: 
counterconditioning (i.e. you pair some other stimulus with a positive or negative reinforcer) or 
via extinction (i.e. you no longer pair the two relata together). Some implicit biases can be 
modified through rational or logical procedures (e.g. see the two aforementioned studies). 
Therefore, at least some implicit biases have a non-associative structure.  
Given the results of these studies, I am very doubtful that an explanation citing only either 
counterconditioning and/or extinction would be able to explain the change in the subjects’ 
behavior. One might try and argue that the studies do not support the conclusions Mandelbaum 
arrives at. But this too runs short. The studies both pretty straightforwardly involve a change in 
implicit biases. The participants are exposed to information that they become consciously (or 
unconsciously) aware of and thereafter you find a change in behaviors that are highly predictive 
of implicit biases. What else could be changing these behaviors other than the newly acquired 
information?  
14 
If there are processes that are both unconscious and rule-based, what follows for dual process 
theory? It ultimately depends on how often the crossover obtains. At this point, we don’t have 
any reason to think that unconscious rule-based processes are just freak occurrences. While there 
are many unconscious associative processes (e.g. processes involved in operant conditioning), 
we now have good reason to think that there is a sizeable subset of type-1 processes that are rule-
based.  
2.2.3 Crossover in decision-making 
Reasoning and decision-making are often touted as cognitive domains where dual process 
theory is most applicable. However, even here we see widespread crossover. Heuristics and 
biases, though typically characterized as unconscious and automatic, can also be conscious and 
controlled (Evans 2006). For example, one familiar with the heuristics and biases literature could 
become more self-aware about one’s own unconscious mental life. Through various training 
methods, those aware of their implicit biases can temporarily eliminate them, thus executing 
some control over their unconscious processes (Lai et al. 2016).  
By using reaction time measures during various reasoning tasks, some researchers have made 
inferences about whether or not a process is type-1 or type-2. However, inferring process type 
from reaction time has not been supported by recent work (Krajbich et al. 2015, Evans et al. 
2015). Evans et al. (2015) state that “researchers in experimental psychology and economics 
should be reluctant to interpret slow RTs as evidence of reflective thinking” (Evans et al. 2015). 
Even proponents of dual process theory have conceded that speed is not indicative of processing 
type (Carruthers 2014 pgs. 11-12, Stanovich and Evans 2013 pg. 226).  
Intuitive processes are often characterized as fast whereas their contrastive reflective 
processes are characterized as slow. A possible counter example to these characterizations would 
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be “Aha! Moments” discussed widely in the insight learning literature (Kounios et. al 2003).17 
The studies within this literature suggest that having time off results in faster completions of 
certain puzzles and are controlled in ways so that the time off doesn’t result in periods of 
conscious reflection. It is plausible that there is some unconscious processing going on during 
the time off which aids in solving the task.  
Type-2 processes have also been characterized as de-contextualized, whereas type-1 
processes have been characterized as contextualized. However, several dual process theorists 
have conceded that both type-1 and type-2 processes operate over contextualized representations 
(De Neys et al. 2005; Evans 2007). Evans puts it like this: “A little reflection will reveal why it 
must be fallacious to equate type-2 processing with abstract, decontextualized thought. Bearing 
in mind that type-2 processing involves putting a load on working memory—and is not a mental 
logic—it is evident that much (indeed most) of the contents that pass through our working 
memories are forms of explicit belief and knowledge that are semantically rich” (Evans 2012). 
Thus, according to Evans, those who think of type-2 as decontextualized or involving purely 
abstract thinking are simply mistaken. This is because type-2 thinking, like all thinking, is 
inherently entangled with several sources of semantically rich, and thus contextualized content.   
While there may be many counter examples to dual process theory when it comes to 
reasoning and decision making, one might think that the view captures something unique about 
the human mind. As humans, we can regularly engage in conscious, reflective decision making. 
Other creatures might not. In the following section, I will present research findings suggesting 
that non-human animals engage in conscious decision making, and that the minds of humans 
may be a difference of degree rather than a difference in kind.  
                                                 
17 Suggested by Carruthers (2014). 
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2.2.4 Crossover in non-human animals 
Initially, claims regarding human minds as unique in the animal kingdom could easily be 
seen as trivial or uninteresting. For example, few would doubt that the possession of complex 
language is very likely to be unique to humans. The same goes for contemplation about the 
workings of the universe or the meaning of life and so on. But the claim being made by certain 
dual process theorists is that type-2 processes are unique to humans (see figure 1). There are at 
least two ways of initially understanding this claim. Whatever is on the list of type-2 features 
will not be found in non-human animals or that there are no non-human animals that instantiate 
all of the type-2 features. The former reading would, for example, deny the possibility of a non-
human animal having conscious cognitive processes. The latter reading denies that there are any 
non-human animals with processes that are fast, conscious, rule-based, etc. While it is expected 
that some of the type-2 processes should co-occur, it is not necessary for all of them to, even in 
humans.  
While one could characterize type-2 processes in a way to exclude animals, say by 
adding a “language-dependent” feature, there is reason to think that many if not all of properties 
listed on the Standard menu are instantiated in animal minds. Conscious processes are likely seen 
in various primates, dolphins and perhaps even in some birds. There is evidence that non-human 
primates such as gorillas, undergo mental time travel, the ability to be aware of one’s future or 
past (Osvath et al. 2014). Other evidence highly suggestive of conscious processing in non-
human animals include insight learning (Kohler 1925) and self-recognition (i.e. mirror test) 
studies (Gallup 1970). Recently, some scientists have made a distinction between automatic 
processes and higher-order control even in rats (Toates 2006). Lastly, there is a wealth of studies 
indicating that bees along with other invertebrates use rule-based, computational processes to 
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navigate their environments (Gallistel 1995). Without going through every feature on the list, it 
should be clear that there are currently multiple strands of evidence from the animal cognition 
literature that go against the idea that the type-1/type-2 distinction only holds true for humans. 
Let’s say that one is not convinced by the current state of evidence. It is important to bear in 
mind that the empirical details are far from being worked out. At this moment, it would be too 
hasty to restrict these processing types to our own species. 
 
3     RESPONSES TO THE CROSSOVER PROBLEM 
It’s an open question as to what properties a given cognitive process will have. Unless we 
have principled reasons for thinking that certain properties would cluster together, we should 
hold off on adopting Rigidity for a particular set of properties. For example, if we were to 
discover good evidence that indicated that type-2 processes were instantiated by working 
memory and that working memory could only give rise to these particular properties, it might 
make sense to adopt a Rigidity-like thesis since we would have principled reasons for supporting 
that prediction. However, the empirical evidence for crossover makes it hard to adopt such a 
view. Those who want to maintain Rigidity will have to say either that the crossover is not 
significant or eliminate some of the crossover features from the Standard menu.  
Two very prominent dual process theorists—Keith Stanovich and Jonathan Evans— 
accept that the crossover is significant and effectively reject the idea that an adoption of Rigidity 
is necessary.  They demonstrate this by virtually removing all of the properties from the Standard 
menu (Evans and Stanovich 2013). In a following section (§4.3), I will argue that this results in a 
very uninteresting dual process thesis and that the more promising move to make would be to 
deny that the crossover is significant.  
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3.1 Objections and replies 
Objection 1: Even if one thinks that the instances of crossover outlined in (§2-3) are 
genuine, these do not collectively result in significant crossover. Significant crossover would 
consist of a misalignment between every property on the Standard menu. The empirical findings 
have just indicated that some (if not most) of the properties crossover.  
Reply: Pointing out that most properties crossover is not enough to warrant the claim that 
there are some properties that do not crossover. Instead, one could reasonably infer that this 
misalignment might be true for the other remaining processes. There is also the issue of defining 
the properties in such a way that disallows for certain hybrid processes. One might think that is 
just incoherent to suppose that there could be certain combinations of properties (e.g. conscious 
and parallel). Rather than interpreting the correlation of certain features as a successful 
prediction of dual process theory, it may just be that certain features have to correlate by 
definition. For example, processes that are automatic are also going to be relatively fast. 
Likewise, controlled processes seem to require some degree of conscious awareness. If the only 
processing features exempt from crossover effects are those features that correlate by definition, 
dual process theory has little predictive power. Dual process theorists must account for the 
existence of hybrid processes and explain why they occur, and hope that such occurrences are 
rare. 
Objection 2: Significant crossover would consist of properties that were misaligned (e.g. 
type-1 process+type-2 feature) most of the time. At best, the instances of crossover discussed are 
just times in which there is some temporary misalignment. This does not mean that the 
misalignment is frequent or the rule rather than the exception. In fact, these cases may just result 
from cherry-picking.  
19 
Reply: I do think that this sort of move is in the right ballpark. In fact, this may be the 
most promising sort of objection a dual process theorist could offer. However, the dual process 
theorist will have to demonstrate that crossover across each of the features is rare. It may be 
argued that the literature on dual process theory is full of instances where no crossover is 
observed. The best explanation for the absence of crossover in most studies is that crossover is 
relatively rare, occurring in only a handful of conditions. The problem with this line of reasoning 
is that many of the studies within the literature on dual process theory are carried out using 
similar experimental methods and designs (e.g. syllogism tasks, Wason-selection task). 
Additionally, dual process theorists do not routinely test for crossover. It may be that even 
crossover obtains within the standard experiments. We know that there are conditions in which 
crossover obtains, and we know that there are conditions in which crossover does not obtain. At 
this point, it is not unreasonable to think that crossover may obtain regularly, but it is largely an 
unsettled empirical matter. 
            Objection 3: Neuroimaging evidence validates dual process theory 
Stanovich and Evans often discuss neuroimaging evidence as support for a real 
distinction (2013). Neuroimaging evidence would strengthen the case for dual process theory 
considerably, though the crossover evidence against Rigidity would still be problematic. Why 
wouldn’t we see distinct neural processing features given that there are two separate systems at 
play? Providing a complete review of the literature would be outside the scope of this thesis, but 
there are a number of problems with the data worth pointing out. Generally speaking, there is 
good reason to be skeptical of the assumption that brain regions map neatly 1-to-1 onto some 
function or behavior (Anderson 2010, 2014). A lack of 1-1 mapping for particular regions casts 
doubt upon findings specifying whole networks of brain regions associated with say, emotional 
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processing or higher cognitive processing. This may be why studies that have tried to identify 
distinct regions for emotion and cognition have been largely inconsistent. For example, 
Lieberman (Lieberman 2007) has proposed that neuroimaging evidence supports the existence of 
an X-system (i.e. reflexive) and C-system (i.e. cognitive), each said to possess many of the same 
features as the dual process standard menu.  The X-system is said to involve brain regions 
typically characterized as “emotional” such as the amygdala, basal ganglia and the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) whereas the C-system is said to be associated regions typically 
associated with cognition (e.g. the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), medial prefrontal cortex 
(MPFC) and the lateral parietal cortex (LPAC)). The problem is that more recent brain imaging 
studies suggest that the relation between cognition and emotion is much more complex and 
interconnected (Pessoa 2015, Okon-Singer et al. 2015). According to Okon-Singer et al.,“there is 
compelling evidence that brain territories and psychological processes commonly associated with 
cognition, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and working memory, play a central role in 
emotion” (Okon-Singer et al. 2015). Likewise, the same has been found true with respect to 
processes associated with emotion playing a role in cognition (Okon-Singer et al. 2015). Even if 
one discounts these more recent studies, there are several cognitive scientists who argue that the 
inconclusive evidence for neural localization (Lieberman 2007) is perfectly compatible models 
of higher cognition other than dual process theory (Osman 2004, Krugalanski and Gigenrezer 
2011). At the present, the neuroimaging evidence is, at best a wash, and at worst, suggesting a 
much more integrated network than dual process theory can allow for. Either way, the 
neuroimaging evidence does not seem to offer much support for the theory.  
Objection 4: Why should psychologists or cognitive scientists care whether dual process 
theories meet the criteria for (HPC) natural kinds? Isn’t this just of interest to philosophers?  
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Reply: While cognitive scientists might not be familiar with the terminology—thus 
unfazed by such claims—the claims they make commit them to philosophical positions. If one 
interprets the dual systems thesis as essentially a natural kinds claim, then those committed to the 
dual systems thesis also (implicitly) commit themselves to the more philosophical claim. To 
answer the objection: psychologists and cognitive scientists should care whether their theories 
commit them to falsehoods. If one takes seriously what a theory predicts, failed predictions ought 
to cause worry. I will now turn to Stanovich and Evans’ revisions to dual process theory in light 
of crossover, and argue that they are wanting. 
3.2 Revisions to dual process theory 
In response to criticisms of dual process theories, Stanovich and Evans (henceforth S&E) 
essentially concede that there exists significant crossover with respect to the properties of the 
Standard menu. Specifically, they state that both types of processes can be rule-based, many of 
the proposed distinctions are too vague (e.g. automatic vs. controlled), and contrary to the title of 
Kahneman’s popularization of dual process theory18, they reject the idea that the speed of a 
cognitive process is indicative of its type (Stanovich and Evans 2013).  
While S&E concede that many of the standard processing features misalign or are 
underspecified, they argue that each processing type has necessary and sufficient conditions, and 
these are what distinguish the two types of processes. In their words, “all of these dichotomies 
were never necessary to establish the two types of processing. The only thing needed is at least 
one dichotomous property that is necessary and sufficient” (Evans, Stanovich 2013). While there 
are some natural kinds that possess necessary and sufficient conditions (e.g. chemical kinds19), it 
                                                 
18 Thinking, fast and slow (2011) 
19 For example, each atomic element has its own signature properties. Each element has its own atomic number, a 
measure of the number of protons within the atom. For instance, having two protons is both necessary and sufficient 
for being a helium atom.  
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is not required that they do so. On the HPC conception, natural kinds can also be identified with 
a cluster of properties that are strongly correlated. To further assess the viability of S&E’s new 
proposal, one must also look carefully at the alleged defining features of each processing type.  
 
Table 2 Defining features of processing types (S&E) 
Type-1 Type-2 
Does not require working memory 
Autonomous  
Requires working memory 
Cognitive decoupling; mental simulation20 
 
The first defining feature of the type-1/type-2 distinction is said to be related to working 
memory. One issue is that the nature and function of working memory as a theoretical construct 
is far from settled (see Baddeley, 2012). For example, contrary to the idea that working memory 
is associated solely with higher-order thinking, there is evidence for an implicit working memory 
system (Hassin et al. 2009). If such alternative models of working memory are right, there could 
very well be crossover (e.g. autonomous processes that require working memory). Putting issues 
of theoretical constructs aside, I take that S&E predict that there won’t be any autonomous 
processes that require the activation of working memory, or mental simulation that can be carried 
out without working memory. I take both of these assumptions  to be questionable, as working 
memory activation seems to be associated with cognition in general, rather than just higher 
cognitive (e.g. conscious) processes (Gilchrist and Cowan 2010). But given the difficulties (e.g. 
crossover, vagueness) facing the properties S&E want to reject, why should we expect these two 
“defining features” to fare any better? As Keren rightfully points out, the kinds of evidence they 
use to support the validity of these distinctions are rather similar to the limited evidence 
                                                 
20 This table is adopted from Evans and Stanovich (2013). 
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marshaled for the “typical features” (Keren 2013). They seem to be in a position no better than 
earlier dual process theorists who put forward the distinctions featured in the Standard menu. 
At this point, why even make the distinction between two types of processing when there is 
already an available construct to use instead (i.e. the activation of working memory)? Instead of 
redirecting the discussion towards necessary and sufficient conditions, I think it would be best 
for dual process theorists to focus on their efforts on explaining away the empirical findings 
discussed in 2.2. If they can show that crossover is relatively rare or only occur within a handful 
of conditions, then there would be no crossover problem. Alternatively, dual process theorists 
could just remove several of the features from the Standard menu. Some combination of the two 
strategies may be the most effective way to deal with the apparent crossover problem. On the 
other hand, one might take the findings discussed in 2.2 to justify not just skepticism towards 
dual process models, but an adoption of eliminativism regarding type-1/type-2 processes.  
 
4 ABANDONING DUAL PROCESS THEORY 
4.1 Type-1/Type-2 Eliminativism 
It is not clear that the theory left behind−after the abandonment of Rigidity−is something 
that we will need to figure into a final psychological theory. Put another way, if one understands 
the end goal of science to give us an account of natural kinds and laws, dual process theory may 
be explanatorily unnecessary for scientific psychology. Type-1/type-2 processes may be useful 
for heuristic purposes, such as generating new hypotheses, but ultimately, the distinction might 
able to be discarded.  
Due to recent empirical discoveries, eliminativist strategies regarding various alleged 
psychological kinds (e.g. emotion, concepts) have been on the rise (Machery 2009, Griffiths 
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1997). Instead of pursuing more old-fashioned eliminativist strategies (Stich and Ravenscroft 
1990, Churchland 1981)—which would render type-1/type-2 processes mythical—I will propose 
a more recent strain of eliminativism which states that type-1/type-2 processes might still exist 
but that the distinction does not map onto natural kinds (Griffiths 1997, Machery 2005). In a 
nutshell, proponents of this more recent strain of eliminativism argue that scientific terms that 
fail to refer to natural kinds are probably useless and might even be a hurdle for scientific 
research programs (Machery 2009, pg. 241). Thus, such scientific terms ought to be eliminated 
from our scientific vocabulary. What follows will be a more or less a generalized version of 
Machery’s eliminativist argument for concepts (Machery 2005, 2009).21   
In previous sections, I discussed findings that suggest that there probably aren’t any 
stable clusters of properties for type-1/type-2 processes. This is because there are many instances 
where type-1 processes can have type-2 features and vice versa. If crossover is widespread, few 
scientific generalizations could be made about type-1/type-2 processes. If one assumes that 
natural kinds require a cluster of numerous co-varying properties as well a large number of 
scientific generalizations, then type-1/type-2 processes wouldn’t be natural kinds, and such a 
grouping may very well be entirely arbitrary. Similar to the sublunary/superlunary distinction 
proposed by Aristotle in his astronomical theory, the type-1/type-2 distinction might just be a 
reflection of human interests during a particular historical period. Since scientific terms that do 
not refer to natural kinds carry great risks (e.g. wasted time, money and energy) with little to no 
benefits, it may seem appropriate to say that type-1/type-2 processes ought to be eliminated from 
our scientific vocabulary. But one may object to this line of reasoning by pointing out that 
elimination carries risks as well. After all, in eliminating dual process language, one might 
                                                 
21 Machery refers to his version of eliminativism as “scientific eliminativism” (Machery 2009).  
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prematurely cancel what may be a fruitful research program. While I think the objection has 
some force, I think there is a strong rejoinder. It may be true that the current state of dual process 
theory makes use of scientific terms that don’t refer to natural kinds, but future dual process 
theories—that are more refined and strongly supported by empirical evidence—might. While this 
may look like backpedaling, I contend that if such future theories include wholly different 
clusters of properties—which is what I would expect given the failings of contemporary 
theories—then future scientists would be talking about different cognitive entities.  
Despite the apparent implausibility of type-1/type-2 natural kinds, it may be argued that 
the distinction still may be useful in science. Holding that type-1/type-2 processes are useful but 
not psychological kinds is a coherent and available position to hold. But whether or not certain 
theoretical terms can be useful is not the deciding factor for adopting them. For example, there 
may be other simpler models that are equally useful for scientific theorizing about the mind 
(5.2).  
I have argued that the theoretical terms of standard conceptions of dual process theory—
which consist of a dual-systems and dual-cluster thesis—probably fail to refer to natural kinds. 
However, one might hold onto a much more modest version of dual process theory, namely, a 
theory that is just committed to a dual types thesis. On this limited view, all that is said is that 
there are two types of cognitive processes. But absent differing homeostatic mechanisms or 
clusters of properties, what would be the motivation for such a distinction?  
4.2 The dual types thesis and the Unimodel 
In this section, I will assess the alleged explanatory benefits of appealing to types in 
accounts of higher cognition. Dual process theorists allege that appealing to two types of 
processes help explain various features of human minds. For example, type-1/type-2 processes 
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are invoked to explain the phenomena of belief bias and to account for individual differences in 
cognitive abilities. I will show how unimodel approach to higher cognition can account for both 
without appealing to any types (Krugalanski 2001, 2013). If I am right, this would take away yet 
another reason to hold onto dual process theory.  
The Unimodel theory of cognition has been alleged to explain the very same data dual 
process theorists take as evidence for duality (Krugalanski 2011, 2013). In light of the evidence 
for crossover, the Unimodel may be fit to fill the shoes of dual process theories, especially if one 
takes up an eliminativist position regarding type 1/type 2 kinds. 
Simpler theories are in general preferable to more complicated theories. If one can reduce 
the number of processing types from two to one without losing any explanatory force, then one 
ought to. But in order for the Unimodel to be preferable, it has to be able to perform the same 
explanatory work are their competitor. Specifically, they need to capture the central phenomenon 
alleged to be explained by dual process theories. Later, I will briefly show how the Unimodel can 
account for two closely related phenomena: i.e. individual differences in performance and belief 
bias.22 First, I will flesh out how the Unimodel is supposed to work.  
One can borrow dual process terminology to illustrate how the Unimodel differs. Dual 
process theorists such as S&E argue that the deployment of type-2 processes requires working 
memory activation and mental simulation. Unimodel theorists argue that the speed or ease at 
which a cognitive process becomes active depends on additional factors, including one’s 
motivation, availability of cognitive resources and familiarity with the domain at hand, and that 
focusing on these factors better explains higher cognition (Kruglanski et al. 2012). To illustrate, 
an expert chess player will possess a much larger set of cognitive resources (i.e. moves and 
                                                 
22 See (Evans et al. 2005) for a dual process theorist’s interpretation of the belief bias literature.  
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strategies to draw) than a novice. Given the abundance of resources, a chess expert will typically 
outperform a novice competitor, provided that the expert is not intoxicated, distracted or 
unmotivated. This contrasts with dual process theory, whose proponents think that it is the 
functional architecture of working memory that best accounts for belief bias and individual 
differences (Pylyshn 1984). The functional architecture of working memory would include the 
its limitations on retrieving and storing cognitive resources, the kinds of operations it can 
perform as well as its buffering capacities (Pylyshn 1984, p. 92). Since cognitive resources are 
typically drawn from long term memory systems (e.g. semantic long term memory), Unimodel 
theorists appeal to factors beyond the functional architecture of WMC to explain performance. 
Both theories essentially agree about the experimental data, though their interpretations diverge 
by focusing on different aspects of working memory; its inherent structure and limitations versus 
the pool of resources it has to work with.  
While everyone would concede that there are individual differences in the functional 
architecture of working memory, there is disagreement about the extent to which this affects 
performance. Unimodel theorists argue that it’s the pool of resources that better explain the 
differences whereas the dual process theorists think you need to look at the machine (WM) itself.  
The advantage goes towards the theory with that does not commit itself to any extra, seemingly 
unnecessary theses.  
Table 3 Differences between the two views 
The Unimodel Dual process theory (S&E) 
Not committed to types thesis Committed to dual types thesis 
Properties fall on a continuum  Dichotomous properties 
WM: Focus on cognitive resources WM: Focus on functional architecture 
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Slow                         fast          unconscious         conscious           automatic      controlled                  LWM                  HWM 
It is not the case that there are processes with special properties that come into play 
during conscious reflection (i.e. type-2 thinking). Rather, the processes involved during “type-2” 
deliberations share many of the same features as the “type-1” processes. As Kruglanski puts it, 
“As one keeps thinking about a problem, new ideas might be activated ‘automatically’ by a 
stream of stimuli encountered on the way, much in the same way as the initial default 
response”(Kruglanski 2013, pg. 245).  On this view, most processes are rule-based and 
automatic, once triggered. The appearance of type-2 processes comes from an enhanced ability 
or capacity to utilize more processes during some cognitively demanding task. Contrary to the 
dichotomous nature of type-1/type-2 features, Unimodel theorists understand the features of 
processes as varying along a continuum. Though it may be tempting to retain use of the type-
1/type-2 language, this view lacks such commitments. One might want to say that there is only 
one kind of cognitive process, on this view which does not correspond to either type-1 or type-2 
but rather a combination of the two. However, a perhaps better way to characterize the view is to 
say it is simply agnostic on how many types of cognitive processes there are. Instead of 
appealing to types, one can just refer to the features involved in the cognitive process at hand. To 
just pick out the far ends of the spectrum seems arbitrary, and seemingly doesn’t provide any 
additional explanatory work.  
Now that the view has been described, I will follow up by demonstrating specifically how 
the unimodel can account for belief bias and individual differences; two phenomena alleged to be 
exclusively captured by dual process theories. 
                      
 
Figure 1 Processes on a continuum 
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Belief bias 
Belief bias is the tendency to consider an argument valid based on the believability of the 
argument’s conclusion rather than assessing its logical structure. This tendency has been shown 
to increase when simultaneously performing working memory tasks and while under time 
pressure (De Neys 2006). Dual process theorists argue that this tendency results from 
overloading working memory. Since type-2 processes require working memory activation, their 
activation will be inhibited, resulting in the activation of (back-up) type-1 processes. Unimodel 
theorists welcome such findings but offer an alternative interpretation. They would concede that 
there is a connection between working memory activation and changes in decision-making 
strategies. However, this is due to a subject’s inability to access the entirety of one’s cognitive 
resources. If an individual is distracted or subject to time constraints, there will be a tendency to 
go with the first options that come to mind (i.e. the backup options). To be clear, working 
memory would still active to some degree, and perhaps there would be disagreement between 
theorists about the extent of activation. The question remains as to why there should be 
consistent individual differences regarding these changes in decision-making. Why are some 
individuals much better at certain tasks, if not for some difference in working memory (e.g. 
faster processing)?  
Individual differences 
Dual process theorists have pointed out that the extent to which one utilizes type-2 
processes correlates with measures of intelligence such as IQ and working memory capacity. 
Furthermore, it is argued there are little to no individual differences when it comes to type-1 
processing (Stanovich and Evans 2013). The Unimodel can easily account for such correlations. 
When there is more time for reflection, individuals with higher working memory and IQ—whom 
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tend to have more cognitive resources to draw from—will tend to perform better (Kruglanski 
2012). The reason why individuals with low working memory and IQ are unable to perform 
better when given more time or fewer distractions is because they simply don’t have many other 
strategies or options to draw from. Their store of cognitive resources (e.g. facts, knowledge, 
mental shortcuts) is comparably scarce. Unlike dual process theories, Unimodel theorists do not 
need to appeal to different types of processing to account for individual differences. The 
Unimodel invokes differences in what working memory has access to rather than available 
cognitive resources to account for the differences in performance. To test these competing 
interpretations, one could devise an experiment that holds working memory capacities constant 
while manipulating the store of available cognitive resources. If the manipulations showed 
drastic changes in performance on working memory tasks, the Unimodel would be supported. If 
the manipulations showed no significant difference across individuals, dual process theory would 
be supported.  
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, I have argued that the type-1/type-2 distinction is threatened by the 
evidence for crossover outlined in §2, assuming that dual process theory is a theory of natural 
kinds. If one grants that the crossover is significant, the natural kinds thesis (i.e. type-1/type-2 
processes are natural kinds)—as well as the dual-cluster thesis—becomes untenable.  However, 
dual process theorists can still hold onto a dual types thesis. I have argued that one would still 
have to be some motivation for the types distinction, and suggested that they may play a useful 
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role in explanation. Nonetheless, however useful these terms may be, they may be undercut by a 
simpler theory which commits itself to one less thesis, the Unimodel.  
While the scope of the paper was meant to focus on one variety of psychological theories, 
its application may be far reaching. For example, dual process theories are not just put forward to 
explain higher cognition; they have also cropped up within discussions of memory (Brainerd 
2002). Similarly, a largely forgotten debate over the validity of memory systems has recently 
resurfaced (Cabeza and Moscovitch 2013). Eerily paralleling the discussion here, the memory 
systems view, which understands memory in terms of distinct systems (e.g. semantic memory, 
episodic memory), is now once again being called into question. Alternative models, such as the 
component process framework, understand memory without appeal to systems, and in terms of a 
dozen or so interconnected components (Witherspoon and Moscovitch 1989). There still remains 
much to learn about the mind-brain and its architecture and we are far from settling which kinds 
or scientific terms will be included in a final psychological theory. Pronouncements to the 
contrary should be met with ample skepticism, as they are probably premature.  
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